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BOOK REVIEWS
ANTITRUST POLICIES: AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN TWENTY INDUS-
TRIES. By Simon N. Whitney. New York: Twentieth Century Fund,
1958. Two volumes: Pp. xxiii, 560; x, 541. $10.00.
In 1950 the Trustees of the Twentieth Century Fund commissioned
Dr. Whitney to explore the question: "How effective had the antitrust
acts actually been in curbing monopolies and restoring conditions of com-
petition ?"' The Fund's Committee on Antitrust Policy in an afterword
explained that the antitrust literature had concentrated on the question of
"whether violation has occurred" while slighting an examination of the
economic effects of decrees "on the behavior of firms or the status of
competition in the affected industries."2  In the process of fulfilling his
assignment, Dr. Whitney simultaneously sought to "shed some light on
the relative merits of the viewpoints expressed by two conflicting groups
of antitrust supporters: "those who feel it is working well and either
needs no change or at most relaxation in certain details, [more reliance
on the rule of reason] and those who feel that it is not effective and
should be applied much more drastically [dissolution of giant corpora-
tions or divesting of their advantages in raw material, patent or distribu-
tion positions] .... Their clash arises over the question whether [govern-
mental] watchfulness has in practice been successful in preserving the
kind of competition a successful economy needs."'
The author, who became chief of the Fund's Research Department
prior to assuming in 1956 his present position as Chief Economist of the
Federal Trade Commission, seeks to accomplish his dual task by means
of studies of twenty representative industries. The eight studies selected
for the first volume-meat packing, chemical manufacturers, steel, paper,
automobiles, cotton textiles, bituminous coal and petroleum-include one
each from six broad classes of the Census of Manufacturers as well as
the two largest minerals industries. To supplement the eight "major"
studies with a broader sample on which to rest conclusions, the second
volume employed an analysis of industries with "famous antitrust suits."
1. WHITNEY, ANTITRUST POLICIES: AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN TWENTY INDUSTRIES
vii (1958) [hereinafter referred to as WHITNEY].
2. 2 id. at 442.
3. 1 id. at 9-10.
4. Id. at 13.
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The twelve included were cast iron pipe, tobacco products, anthracite,
aluminum, shoe machinery, motion pictures, tin cans, farm machinery,
corn products, cement, Pullman cars and insurance. One can scarcely
complain of any obvious bias in the overall selection.
Each study is treated in much the same manner: an historical descrip-
tion of the industry's industrial organization; the antitrust cases which
have emerged and (at least when won by the government) their effects;
an examination of the industry's resulting competitive status as reflected
in its structure, behavior and performance; and a handy summary. In
addition an appendix to Volume 2 includes brief critical comments on
each of the twenty case studies. For this purpose the author attempted
to secure comments from both an industry representative and a disin-
terested scholar. The thirteen industry representatives who accepted
the challenge (labor, government, or former governmental representa-
tives substituting in the remaining situations) were far more charitable
toward Whitney's analysis and conclusions than the academicians, in-
cluding this reviewer in his critique of the cement chapter.
The book is well organized and its preparation reflects painstaking
effort. Dr. Whitney and his staff of researchers have assembled a
wealth of valuable economic data from industry publications, government
reports, published monographs and unpublished doctoral and master
theses-as well as court decisions and decrees. The veritable cornu-
copia of legal and economic data and their related source citations insures
that the two volume study will find a useful spot on the reference shelf
of any economist or lawyer interested in industrial economics and anti-
trust policy. However, his deliberate effort to eschew theoretical study
in order to achieve "a practical study of industry and national policy in
action" results in a failure to ask many important economic questions
and to present (or to indicate the difficulty or impossibility of supplying)
data helpful toward their answering.
Summarizing in a final section6 the impact of the antitrust laws on
the economic organization and operation of these twenty industries, the
author reaches the following conclusions concerning the economic effect
of antitrust on today's economy:
1). Dissolution cases have not made a major contribution toward
the growth of competition, nor are they likely to. In the classic cases of
government defeat (American Can in 1916,' U.S. Steel in 1920' and
5. Ibid.
6. 2 id. at 385-438.
7. United States v. American Can Co., 230 Fed. 859 (D. Md. 1916).
8. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
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International Harvester in 1927') economic events generated a decline
of the defendants' market shares anyway. Moreover, other forces (in-
cluding the Surplus Property Act of 1944) are leading to declines in
market concentration in aluminum, titanium and meat packing despite
aborted quests for dissolution. In the classic cases of government vic-
tory (Standard Oil' and American Tobacco" in 1911) declines would
have come about notwithstanding, though government intervention
speeded the process. Although dissolution of the du Pont "powder
trust" in 1912 is said to have been beneficial to the explosive industry,
the divestitures in 1918 of Corn Products' unimportant plants and Inter-
national Harvester's secondary lines of equipment were found to produce
insignificant results, especially since other factors were encouraging the
growth of rivals. Divorcement suits are somewhat more enthusiastically
received for reason of their creating freer market relationships. But no
great practical consequences can be traced to the anthracite divorcements,
while motion picture divorcement is said to have aggravated the impact of
television upon exhibitors, since formerly integrated producers have
fewer incentives to grind out pictures in volume and exhibitors are en-
couraged to bid sharply for the reduced film supply. Whitney believes
that dissolution directed at oligopoly structures would probably be waste-
ful and accomplish little since he finds no evidence that big business
"operates less efficiently for the public welfare than industries composed
of many small firms."'" Since there are almost no firms left that are
vulnerable as monopolies under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Whitney
believes that dissolution can be retired from our antitrust arsenal, while
we concentrate on divestiture proceedings under the revised Section 7 of
the Clayton Act. In summary, dissolution served a useful function "in
some instances, by shortening the period needed for competition to assert
itself against an original near-monopoly; but it has not achieved, and has
not seemed likely to achieve, valuable results when used in oligopoly
situations."'"
2). The antitrust laws, by creating a fear of prosecution and ren-
dering collusive agreements unenforceable has successfully reduced the
prevalence of overtly collusive price, output, basing-point and other cartel-
like activity. (However, the role which mergers and other concentration-
inducing or perpetuating activities may have played in reducing the need
for illegal collusion is not discussed.)
9. United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927).
10. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
11. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
12. 2 WHITNEY 392.
13. Id. at 390.
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3). The antitrust laws have also helped to prevent the monopolistic
use and to lessen the competition-inhibiting use of such practices as tying
clauses, exclusive dealing and price discrimination-although such prac-
tices are said to be less a cause than consequence of monopoly.
4). No characteristic tendency is found toward greater or lesser
concentration. Certain near-monopolies have disappeared, but the lead-
ing firms as a group have usually "held their own or gained some ground
as a combined result of economies of size and of growth through
merger."1  Vertical integration has constituted a real economic issue in
fourteen of the twenty industries studied, while entry is found to have
become increasingly difficult.
5). Competitive practices in the typical industry studied are found
to reflect the oligopolistic structure. Prices are "administered" rather
than "market determined." Price leadership and a form of price uni-
formity conducive to price stability is prevalent. There is little prospect
of generating more price competition. Moreover, if somehow success
were achieved in attaining significant price competition, it is likely to be
cutthroat and result in either monopoly or secret agreements. However,
to the non-price product rivalry induced by lack of price competition is
attributed our rising standard of living. Even the $9 billions per year
of advertising (as of 1955) is found to constitute not really waste, but
a blessing in disguise. Not only is 20 to 25 per cent of it presumed to
subsidize consumers of the press and air waves, but advertising also pro-
vides the basis for raising living standards by informing the public about
new products and by enabling economies of scale (the relationship be-
tween volume and long-run average costs) in both production and distri-
bution, through concentrating demand on particular brands in a national
market. Moreover, advertising has contributed to the growing intensity
of interindustry competition.
6). Finally, almost every industry is given a gold star for its glow-
ing "performance" whether measured by its vast increases in production
or output per man hour. (No effort is made to determine whether any
of these industries might have done better, equally as well, or worse un-
der different conditions. Moreover, improvement in agricultural pro-
ductivity during the past two decades would exceed that of virtually all
on his roster. That supplying industries may largely explain the per-
formance in agriculture is irrelevant in terms of Whitney's measuring
rod, since he makes no effort to ascertain the extent to which efficiency
gains are the result of improvements in a supplying industry.)
14. Id. at 405.
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7). In a final overview Dr. Whitney concludes that the economic
progress which characterizes American industry is at least in part at-
tributable to the kind of competition which prevails-and which our anti-
trust laws have helped to promote, both directly and through the omni-
present hauntings of Sherman's ghost. But vast natural resources, a
huge domestic market, American political policies and traditions (politi-
cal stability, respect for property, a minimum of controls, positive en-
couragements to business), relative freedom from costly wars, and a
pioneering and competitive national character must share the credit. In-
deed the antitrust laws are found to be as much an effect as a cause of
our national spirit. However, their presence has helped to preserve the
"competitive spirit" by (1) erecting "a barrier to the 'cartelization' of
American industry along European lines; (2) reducing "attempts to
create monopolies, by merger or otherwise"; and (3) helping "to main-
tain both equality of opportunity and freedom of entry in industry-a
never-ending struggle in which there are bound to be defeats along with
successes."
1'
Dr. Whitney's evaluation that our antitrust laws have made a mod-
est, though significant, contribution to our economy seems accurate
enough to this reviewer. But I find unconvincing his recurring assur-
ance that the remedial character of our current antitrust policy is suf-
ficient. Especially disturbing is his calm acceptance of the suppression
of price competition in oligopolistic industries-at least when it develops
"spontaneously," and without formal collusion. "Spontaneous" may
have been the round of cigarette price increases in 1931 when tobacco
prices had plummetted, as well as recent rises in steel prices during
periods of appreciable unutilized capacity, and the hike in Ford's pre-
viously announced prices on its 1957 models following General Motor's
announcement of a greater price increase. But it is certainly inconsistent
with independent action designed to increase an individual firm's market
share.
In his critical analysis of the Bituminous Coal Commission, he
correctly states, "There is no way to express in a statute or regulation
any wholly just and equitable reconciliation of the conflicting claims of
producers and consumers."1 However, he expresses no similar concern
for a "conflicting claim" when the resolution is privately administered
by price leadership. Whitney finds no undesirable consequences in Gen-
eral Motors' ability for the past thirty years to set "a 'standard' price
15. Id. at 436-37.
16. 1 id. at 403.
676
NOTES
which would yield a 'standard' return on its investment."' 7 Nor does
Whitney comment upon the "standard" return which has enabled GM to
realize on the average well above 20% after taxes on its net worth since
World War II, notwithstanding the appreciable cost inflating effects of
advertising and annual styling changes. The "spontaneous price leader-
ship" of oligopoly-or monopoly for that matter-might over the long
haul (but not cyclically) generate prices close to the level which price
competition would generate if either entry or interindustry competition is
a pervading force. However, such latent competition ordinarily appears
to provide insufficient consumer protection, since Whitney admits the
presence of substantial barriers to entry. Even in his defense of the
cellophane industry 8 he fails to show that the substitutional effects of
"interchangeable rivals" were sufficiently great to create an exceedingly
high elasticity of demand for cellophane-as might be expected under
conditions of monopolistic (differentiated) competition among many
products sold in the same market.
Progressiveness and product competition are, of course, commend-
able, but many will remain unconvinced that these are inevitably incon-
sistent with greater market (or alternative) controls over the price-
making process. Industrial statesmanship (with or without prods by
Sherman's ghost) will scarcely be deemed an adequate substitute in a
democratic society. Moreover, it is not at all clear that the occasional
statesman-like, self-abnegation of steel oligopolists in underpricing their
product during the extreme shortage of postwar periods1 9 constitutes a
compensating advantage, since private allocation schemes will inevitably
add to the disadvantages of new entrants (lacking historical quotas) in
purchasing industries. (In a later chapter Whitney reports that Kaiser-
Frazer paid $40 million more than rival auto firms would have had to
pay for steel during the gray market period of shortage.2")
Dr. Whitney's explanation of oligopolists' resistance to price de-
clines in times of redundant capacity is both deficient in economic analy-
sis and questionable in its conclusions. Steel,2 cement22 and farm ma-
chinery 3 producers are defended in their resistance to price reductions
during recessions in demand because the price-quantity response for the
industry as a whole is found to be inelastic. But a monopolist would
17. Id. at 491.
18. Id. at 219-220.
19. Id. at 312-13.
20. Id. at 477.
21. Id. at 309.
22. 2 id. at 289.
23. Id. at 252.
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behave likewise and inelasticity of the total demand schedule does not
inhibit farmers or bituminous coal producers24 from cutting prices when
demand declines. Whitney suggests that the economy would not be bene-
fitted by price decreases because potential net savings to consumers would
not bulk large from reductions of particular products " and because con-
sumers would not appreciably step up their quantity demanded (and,
hence, the amount produced) because of a particular price reduction. But
a fallacy of composition is entailed in each handle of his rationalizations,
and he fails to examine the issue of consumer real purchasing power.
Greater gross margin (price-marginal cost) flexibility in adminis-
tered price industries during recessions in demand could generate an ap-
preciable shift in the money flows from gross cash retentions by business
to household incomes. In turn, households might be expected to have a
higher marginal propensity to spend than would business which is con-
fronted with excess capacity. Hence, a less expansionary governmental
monetary-fiscal policy could suffice in combatting the macro-economic
problem of deficient demand, thus lessening the dangers of inflationary
consequences. Indeed, many economists would attribute at least part of
the persistent upward drift of the American price level since 1952-de-
spite recurrent periods of deficient aggregative demand-to the failure of
administered price industries to behave in a competitive price direction.
Whitney applauds only those increases of price competition which
antitrust action can bring about by attacking collusive agreement. (But,
"Supporting evidence, such as letters, minutes of meetings, or testimony
of participants, is necessary to prove collusion."2 ) He commends attacks
on the formal exchange of price lists in the paper industry, although con-
ceding that it was more a matter of convenience and that a basic change
in results can scarcely be expected." He likewise commends the attack on
collusive use of the basing-point system, but he admits and appears un-
concerned that a virtually equivalent formula results when oligopolistic
sellers use the system without overt agreement. 2' He has little regard
for those who would infer either collusion, unfair competition, or dis-
crimination from an industry-wide adherence to a rigid pattern of de-
livered prices. Whitney believes such efforts to induce unsystematic
"beating" of competition might only harm buyers themselves (by creat-
ing, in turn, more uncertainty and price competition among them?).
24. 1 id. at 419-20.
25. Id. at 209-10; 2 id. 207-09.
26. 2 id. at 417.
27. 1 id. at 342.
28. Id. at 287; 2 id. at 395.
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Dissolution, as a tool for reducing oligopolistic pricing restraints,
is also opposed. He fears that, if successful, it will generate such great
price flexibility that losses due to cutthroat competition in depression
would probably result either in monopoly through merger, excessive ex-
its or secret agreements.2" If the industry managed to remain competi-
tive, insufficient capacity and exceedingly high profits would accom-
pany the next boom,3" although high profits might induce excessive entry
and capacity during the boom."' Concerning Whitney's latter fears, it
would appear that he sells businessmen much too short in suggesting
that they neglect longer-run prospects when they make investment deci-
sions concerning abandonments or additions to an industry's stock of
capital. Expectations of high prices and profits during the next boom
would slow down decisions to retreat during a recession's "cutthroat"
price competition and vice versa. Indeed, such long run considerations
are not entirely lacking in bituminous coal and textiles-in which indus-
tries, it might also be added, "cutthroat" competition has resulted in
neither monopoly or effective secret price agreements.
However, Whitney's objections to the remedy of dissolution are not
confined to his impression that modern industry cannot survive price
competition. The "advantages of size" would be sacrificed. Save for
his admission that U. S. Steel has no production economies over its major
rivals and that production economies of scale are reached at a relatively
low level in cigarettes, Dr. Whitney makes little systematic effort to
examine quantitative estimates of scale economies. Indeed, Joe Bain's
much-cited estimates, surprisingly, are nowhere mentioned. 2 He is con-
fident that an increase in the number of cigarette firms, especially if
accompanied by reduced advertising expenditures, would lead to a rise
in distribution costs which would more than offset any reduction in
profit and advertising margins. 3 Any dissolution of the major farm
machinery producers "might have the effect of increasing both unit costs
of both manufacturing and distribution."3 4  Any split-off from General
Motors of either an automotive or non-automotive division, it is said,
would result in higher all-around costs or reduced quality 3 yet one might
wonder if division executives would not get a greater "boost in morale"
29. Id. at 313; 2 id. at 420.
30. 1 id. at 313.
31. Id. at 312.
32. Bain, Economies of Scale, Concentration and Entry, 44 Am. EcoN. Rxv. 15.
Whitney does, however, refer briefly to Bain's estimates of capital requirements for
entry in his concluding summary. 2 WHITNEY 407.
33. 2 WHITNEY 27, 51-54.
34. Id. at 249.
35. 1 id. at 484-85, 494.
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by becoming full-fledged bosses than they obtain from their unit's growth
within the confines of an "executive bonus plan.""8 The relief sought in
the abandoned dissolution suit of 1948 against the biggest meat packers
"would probably have added to waste rather than to competition."3 Yet
the medium-packers have been more profitable than the giants ;38 only
industry opinion is offered to support the proposition that independent
brokers could not provide the arbitrage function in distributing meat as
well as national packers ;39 and buying rivalry as between neighboring
stockyards could have been enhanced, although economic concentration
at each particular stockyard would not have been altered by the decree.4"
Any dissolution of major paper companies "would do damage to the
policy of 'sustained yield' which most of them have adopted,"'41 but no
attention is given to the adoption of alternative governmental controls,
where necessary, to promote conservation of timber.
Whitney also believes that any dissolution of large aluminum com-
panies would entail a net loss of research development despite an achieve-
ment of "greater diversity" of approach.42 He fears that the higher cost
of small scale shoe machinery manufacture might have offset the gains of
competitive technological progress which could have accompanied dis-
solution of United Shoe.4" Finally, he states, an outstanding record of
progress has earned the chemical industry "the right not to be the first
target of proposals to reform the patent system or dissolve large corpora-
tions."44 But how could an industry based on rapidly advancing modern
science fail to show a record of rapid technological progress? Even such
European monopolists as I.C.I. and I.G. Farben have done this. More-
over, since the American chemical industry stands among the leading
proponents of tariff protection, one might wonder if it has been sig-
nificantly more progressive than its lower wage paying, European rivals?
Thoughtful proponents of dissolution do not propose to restructure
American industry into the early nineteenth century, although Dr. Whit-
ney's contrasting references to "small firms" suggests that the issue is
one of particles versus planets. 5 Whitney's data and references suggest
that although pure competition scarcely described the structure of the
36. Id. at 482.
37. Id. at 390.
38. Id. at 68-70.
39. Id. at 68, 71.
40. Id. at 40, 57.
41. Id. at 380.
42. 2 id. at 116.
43. Id. at 142-44.
44. Id. at 252.
45. Id. at 392, 437-38.
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steel industry during the 1890's, it frequently described its price behavior.
We know too little about economies of scale, but it seems improbable
that most industries could be fragmented, without excessive sacrifice, to
the moderate level of concentration which characterized steel just before
1900."6 Nevertheless, substantial social gains might be forthcoming
from even modest dissolution-even at some slight sacrifice in short
run production efficiency: (1) Variegated competition in research activ-
ity and product introduction might generate a somewhat faster rate of
progress by increasing the number of trial and error experiments of
heretical ideas. By way of illustration, without the chance for American
consumers to demonstrate their response to foreign manufacturers and
American Motors, how long might we have had to wait for a refutation
of the Big Three's certainty that no significant minority in the U. S.
desired a smaller and simpler automobile. (2) A greater number of
manufacturers in a given field can increase the independence and security
of dealers or suppliers. Would not this provide a safer and less feudal
solution than Dr. Whitney's suggestion that auto manufacturers exercise
noblesse oblige by developing as "constructive human relations policies
with their dealers as they do with their employees." 4 7 Moreover, one
wonders if many of Whitney's listed "economies of size" might not be
private rather than social. For example, in autos48 the pre-emption of
dealer positions and the manipulation of consumer tastes through styling
cycles, mass advertising and the omnipresent weight of fashion-setting
volume may contribute less to a further reduction of unit costs of majors
than to an inflation of unit costs of minor rivals who are left unable to
sell the modest volume necessary for production economies. (3) Politi-
cal, social and psychological benefits would flow from decreasing the
extent to which individuals, as consumers of ideas, products and person-
nel policies, are manipulated by the self-imposed, "socially responsible"
decisions of a relatively small number of corporate managements possess-
ing substantial exemption from pressures to allocate resources according
to the dictates of market forces.49 Surely an evaluation of an industry's
contribution toward the public welfare must entail more than a counting
of the physical output achieved. In turn, I suspect that most Americans
would presume that the dissolution of corporations, which could be ac-
complished with no or only minor sacrifices in the production of physical
goods, would result in industries which operate more "efficiently for the
46. 1 id. at 288.
47. Id. at 514.
48. Id. at 472-79.
49. Kaysen, The Social Significance of the Modern Corporation, 47 AT. EcoN.
REv. 311, esp. at 316-19.
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public welfare."50
Moreover, whenever society is reluctant to carry far the process of
dissolution, strict limits might be placed on particular business practices
which are conducive to coercion or exclusion when practiced by firms
possessing (separately or jointly) significant market power. The entry-
deterring impact of full line forcing, exclusive dealing and systematic
price discrimination is recognized by Vhitney. But he is immobilized
when it comes to proposing a "double standard" test by which such prac-
tices might be combatted where they fail to contribute to new entry or
to behavior which enhances competition.5 ' lie is worried that limiting
the ability of major sellers to get "adequate representation" in the distri-
bution of their products will result in a deterioration of dealer service or
add to the supplier's costs. He fears that limiting the ability of major
producers to meet the threat of potential competition by discriminatory
price offerings will lead to wasteful duplication through backward inte-
gration by large canners" or make any major petroleum refiner "a 'sitting
duck' unable to resist raids by little competitors. . . ."" However,
would not the emergence of such entrance and independent behavior (or
the alternative general reduction of prices by majors) be socially de-
sirable ?
Furthermore, might not an application of the revised Section 7 of
the Clayton Act be desirable against the current merger movement for
geographical and product diversification when practiced by leading
firms? Whitney appears to be unconcerned with this development. How-
ever, both existing and potential competition may be reduced by: (1) ef-
fecting the elimination of specialized enterprises more prone, upon occa-
sion, to behave independently; (2) decreasing the tendency of enterprises
bent upon gaining diversification to increase the number of alternative
sources of supply through lateral entry with newly constructed facilities;
and (3) increasing the areas where diversified firms, through their
ability to meet competition selectively, may coerce existing or deter the
emergence of new relatively specialized firms (without at least having
contributed to competition by adding an extra seller when entering a
new area).
Whitney also hesitates to recommend the development of a double
50. 2 WHITNEY 392.
51. Exclusive dealing or long term requirement contracts, when used by a new
firm may assist entry into a concentrated industry. Unsystematic price discrimination
will undermine basing point systems and other cooperative forms of oligopolistic price
behavior.
52. 2 WHITNEY 226.
53. 1 id. at 136.
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standard for related antitrust policies beyond the confines of litigation.
This could be done, for example, by limiting advertising expenditures of
relatively large enterprises, inducing the expansion of defense-related
industries by means of direct governmental loans to new or smaller enter-
prises (in lieu of accelerated amortization which favors enterprises cur-
rently realizing appreciable earnings) and limiting the patent protection
of leading corporations to defensive, non-exclusive grants. The only
approval acceded by Whitney to extra-conventional antitrust policy ap-
pears in his commendation of provisions of the Surplus Property Act
which facilitated the emergence of new entrance into basic aluminum and
synthetic nitrogen manufacture.
One major shortcoming in Whitney's contention that government
defeat in its quest for dissolution of U.S. Steel, American Can and Inter-
national Harvester was relatively unimportant, is his failure to explain
the inevitable stimulus that these decisions gave to a merger movement
among the lesser firms in both these and other industries. Indeed, Whit-
ney applauded the subsequent merger movement for its contribution to-
ward reducing the overwhelming dominance by the above firms in their
respective industries. However, might not the degree of concentration
in these, and some other, industries be somewhat less today if the courts
had dissolved these leaders-in turn reducing both subsequent incentives
to merge and the toleration accorded merger in succeeding anti-trust
proceedings ?
On the whole, I think that Dr. Whitney has succeeded admirably in
detailing for the Twentieth Century Fund the effectiveness of the anti-
trust laws. 4 But his very success has only confirmed this reviewer's
prior impression that these laws have not (to date) in practice been suc-
cessful in preserving the kind of competition a successful economy needs.
Since August Heckscher reminds us in his Foreword that the previous
Twentieth Century Fund study in this field by Stocking and Watkins
concluded that the trend toward collective controls and concerted action
"is not, in our view, inevitable," perhaps it is now about time for the
Fund to commission a comprehensive study to ascertain what particular
changes in our antitrust laws and their administration (as well as related
governmental policies) might increase the effectiveness of competition.
SAMUEL M. LOESCHERt
54. Id. at vii.
t Associate Professor of Economics, Indiana University.

